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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
PATRICIA M. BURNHAM,
Plaintiff and
Appellant,
vs.
BANKERS LIFE &
CASUALTY COMPANY,
an Illinois corporation,
Defendant and
Respondent.

Case No.
12261

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
NATURE OF THE CASE
Originally this was an action commenced by
Mrs. Patricia M. Burnham to recover as beneficiary
under a reinstated $10,000 whole life insurance policy and an attached $40,000 decreasing term rider
issued by respondent to Dr. Preston J. Burnham, deceased. The case previously came before this Court
when plaintiff and appellant appealed from an order
granting the defendant's Motion For Summary
Judgment and dismissing plaintiff's complaint. (R.
57, 58). Plaintiff and appellant's second appeal to
this Cour't is from an Order denying a Motion For
Summary Judgment made after the case was remanded for trial following the first appeal. ( R. 95).
1
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The first appeal to this court was from the
granting of a Motion For Summary Judgment (R.
22) made by the defendant in the trial court. The
Honorable Merrill C. Faux granted that motion on
two grounds - First: under Utah Code Annotated
Section 31-22-18(2) the insurance company had the'
right upon reinstatement of the policy to" ... exclude
or restrict liability to the same extent that such liability could have been or was excluded or restricted
when the policy or contract was originally issued, and
such exclusion or restriction shall be effective from
the date of reinstatement;" and second that "Dr.
Burnham's failure to disclose (previous visits with a
psychiatrist) prevented the insurer from exercising
its right to evaluate what it might have learned from
Dr. Fowler and to apply the restriction to the rein·
stated policy, and that this failure to disclose was a
misrepresentation by omission and a fraud upon the
insurer." (R. 56, 57). Plaintiff appealed from the
granting of defendant's Motion For Summary Judg·
ment (R. 68) and in Burnham vs. Bankers Life &
Casualty Company, 24 Utah 2d 277, 470 P. 2d 261
( 1970) this Court held that the trial court erred in ,
granting the Motion For Summary Judgment and ·
that the case should be
" . . . remanded with the disposition in
accordance with this opinion." 470 P. 2d at
261.
Plaintiff then filed a Motion For Judgment
1
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76) which was denied (R. 78) and a Motion For
Summary Judgment (R. 79) on grounds that
(R.

" ... there are no issues of material fact
?-nd that plaintiff is entitled to a summary
Judgment as a matter of law in accordance
with the opinion of the Utah Supreme Court
on June 2, 1970, and reported as 470 P. 2d
261." (R. 79)
1

Plaintiff's Motion For Summary Judgment was
heard on September 21, 1970, and denied by the Honorable Marcellus K. Snow ( R. 95) . From a denial
of her Motion For Summary Judgment plaintiff commenced the present appeal (R. 97, 106).
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmance of the trial court's
denial of plaintiff's Motion For Summary Judgment
and instruction from this Court for the court below
to proceed with a trial on the merits.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Court will recall from the Burnham opinion, supra, that plaintiff, Mrs. Preston J. Burnham,
initially instituted this action to recover as beneficiary under a $40,000 decreasing term rider attached
to a $10,000 whole life insurance policy issued by defendant, Bankers Life & Casualty Company, to Dr.
Preston J. Burnham. The $40,000 term rider lapsed
on April 1, 1967 because Dr. Preston J. Burnham
failed to pay the premiums. The basic $10,000 whole
life policy continued in force, however, because it was
3

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

supported by premiums paid from the cash reserve.
On June 28, 1967, Dr. Burnham filed for reinstatement of the policy and paid the premiums which were
then in default. Upon the death of Dr. Preston these
~re~iums were returned to the plaintiff without preJUd1ce to her right to bring this action. The defendant
paid the basic coverage of $10,000 provided in the
policy but refused to pay the amount claimed to be
due under the term rider because Dr. Burnham had
failed to list Dr. Herbert B. Fowler as a physician
whom he had consulted when he applied for reinstatement of the $40,000 term policy.
A deposition taken of Dr. Fowler disclosed that
Dr. Burnham had consulted with Dr. Fowler on a
professional basis with respect to marital difficulties
eighty times during the period from February 13,
1963 to November 9, 1965 (Dep. Dr. Fowler, p. 11).
During certain consultations with Dr. Fowler, Dr.
Burnham made such statements as "I wish I were
dead" or "I would be better off dead" (Dep. Dr. Fowler, p. 24). On February 20, 1968 Dr. Burnham did
in fact commit suicide.
By Affidavit of its attorney, Don J. Hanson, defendant asserted that had it known about Dr. Burnham's visits with Dr. Fowler, and particularly the
expressions made by Dr. Burnham during those consultations, it would not have renewed the $40,000
rider (R. 24, 25). Based upon this Affidavit, the
pleadings and 'the deposition of Dr. Fowler, def~n
dant moved for a summary judgment (R. 22), which
4
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Motion was granted, and a Memorandum Decision
was issued by Judge Merrill C. Faux on November
14, 1969 (R. 56). The trial court concluded that under Utah Code Annotated, Section 31-22-18(2) the
insurance company could
" ... exclude or restrict liability to the
same extent 'that such liability could have been
or was excluded or restricted when the policy
or contract was originally issued, and such
exclusion or restriction shall be effective from
the date of reinstatement." ( R. 56)
It was also held by the trial court that the failure of
Dr. Burnham to disclose his visits with Dr. Fowler
constituted a "misrepresentation by omission and a
fraud upon the insurer" (R. 56). From the trial
court's granting of defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment plaintiff appealed to this Court (R.

68).

In Burnham vs. Bankers Life & Casualty Com-

pany, 24 Utah 2d 277, 470 P. 2d 261 (1970) this

Court held that the trial court erred in granting defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment and remanded the case for ''disposition in accordance with
this opinion" (R. 74), 470 P. 2d at 265. It was also
held that Utah Code Annotated, Section 31-22-18(1),
which provides
"A reinstated policy of life insurance or
annuity contract may be contested on account
of fraud or misrepresentation of facts material to the reinstatement only for the same period following reinstatement and with the same
5
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C?nditio~s and exceptions as the policy proy1~es ~1th respect to contestability after or-

1gmal issuance"

did not govern this case since the original policy was
issued in 1962 and the statute was enacted in 1963.
This Court further held that
''An application for reinstatement is (not)
an offer to enter into a contract to reinstatf:
the old policy but is merely a step to compiy
with the conditions specified by the company
in the reinstatement clause of the insurance
contract." 470 P. 2d at 265.
On remand the plaintiff moved first that a judgment
for the plaintiff be entered, which was denied (R.
78), and then moved for summary judgment (R. 79).
From an Order denying plaintiff's Motion For Summary Judgment (R. 95) the present appeal was commenced.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO
GRANT PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE THE INCONTESTABILITY CLAUSE OF'THE POLICY WAS
RENEWED BY THE APPLICATION FOR REINSTATEMENT.

As we understand the opinion of this Court in
Burnham vs. Bankers Life & Casualty Company, 24 '
Utah 2d 277, 470 P. 2d 261 (1970), the reinstatement aplication did not in contemplation of law constitute a new contract but merely a continuation of
6
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the original policy. The opinion did not dispose of the
question as to whether the incontestability clause of
the original policy was revived by reinstatement of
the policy. The incontestability clause of the policy
provides:
"This policy shall be incontestable after
it has been in force during the lifetime of the
Insured for 2 years from its date of issue, except for nonpayment of premiums, and except
as to provisions relating to total and permanent disability benefits and provisions granting
additional insurance specifically against death
by accident, if any." (R. 9)
We cannot agree that Utah Code Annotated,
Section 31-22-18 ( 1), "was undoubtedly a legislative
response to a serious omission in the law ... " 470 P.
2d at 265. To the contrary, most of the nation's courts
have held that where a policy has been in force and
the two-year contestability period has run, the contestability clause runs anew when the policy has been
reinstated, and the period begins from the time of reinstatement even though no statute is involved. The
courts in the majority of jurisdictions have reasoned
tha:t reinstatement either effects a new contract of
insurance, the terms of which are determined from
the policy as originally issued, or renews the original
contract in full with all of its terms. Consequently,
the incontestability clause runs anew from the date
of reinstatement. The effect of this line of reasoning
is that the insurer may on grounds of fraud or other
material misrepresentation contest the policy as re7
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instated within the time limit as specified in the con.
testability clause of the policy as issued, and follow.
ing the expiration of such time is prohibited from
making further contest. Thus, in Lanier vs. New
York Life Insurance Company, 88 F. 2d 196, (5th
Cir. 1937), Cert. denied 301 U.S. 693 (1937), where
the incontestable clause agreement provided that ·
"This policy shall be incontestable after two years
from its date of issue except for nonpayment of premium," the court held that the insurer had two years
from the date of reinstatement to contest the policy.
In New York Life Insurance Company vs. Seymout,
45 F. 2d 47 (6th Cir. 1930), it was held that a twoyear incontestable clause in a life insurance policy
though not specifically made applicable in case of a
reinstatement of the policy after a lapse might fairly '
be construed as having taken fresh effect when the '
policy again came into force by a reinstatement; and
that the right to contest because of fraud in the reinstatement would expire two years after the date of
reinstatement. The court stated that while this conclusion could not be predicated upon any precise language in the policy, it was a reasonable inference as
to what the parties intended by reinstating a policy
containing an incontestable clause.
1

1

In McCary vs. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company, 236 C.A. 2d 501, 46 Cal. Reporter
121, 23 ALR 3rd 733 ( 1965), the incontestable clause
provided that a llfe insurance policy's supplementary
provision for family income should be incontestable
8
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after it had been in force during the lifetime of the
instffed for two years from the date of issue except
for nonpayment of premiums. An application for reinstatement of the policy was filled out after two
years from the date of issue and contained a false
representation by the insured as to his health. The
insured died three months later, and it was contended by the beneficiary that the two-year limitation
period in the clause barred the insurer after the expiration of the period from contesting the truthfulness of the insured's representations in the application for reinstatement. The court held that the insurer was not barred by the incontestable clause from
defending against the reinstatement which it allowed
in reliance upon the insured's representations.
Other courts have held that reinstatement is a
contract to reinstate or revive the contract of insurance as issued, but that the incontestable clause becomes no part of the contract for reinstatement. As
a result under such decisions, the insurer may contest
the contract to reinstate upon grounds of fraud or the
like at any time without reference to the incontestable clause in the policy as issued. The contract for
the restoration of the policy like any other contract
may be attacked at any time for fraud or other material misrepresentation in procurement without reference to the incontestable clause in the original policy.

In McMahon vs. Continental Assurance Company, 308 Ill. App. 27, 30 N.E. 2d 959 (1940), the
9
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p.olicy ~on.ta~ned provisions for reinstatement at any
time w1th1n its terms upon written application accom.
panied by evidence of insurability satisfactory to the
insurer. The policy also contained a clause to the effect that the policy should be incontestable after two
years from its date of execution except for nonpayment of premiums. The court in that case held that
although 'the policy had been in force for more than
two years when it lapsed for nonpayment of premiums, the insurer could urge as a defense to a recovery by the beneficiary that the reinstatement of
the policy after it had lapsed was procured through
fraudulent representations in the application for reinstatement, such a defense not constituting a contest
or attack on the original policy but upon contract for
the reinstatement thereof. The court further said
that inasmuch as the insurer was induced to reinstate
the policy of insurance as a result of the fraud of the
insured, the policy was never in fact or law reinstated
and that it necessarily foll'owed that the situation
was the same as if no contract for reinstatement was
ever entered into.

In Acacia Midual Life Association vs. Kaul, 114
NJE 491, 169 A. 36 ( 1933) neither the orginal policy
nor the contract of reinstatement contained any provision limiting attack upon the reinstatement to the
contestable period fixed in the policy. The court said
that the reinstatement of the policy was neither the
issuance of a new policy nor the reissuance of the original policy but merely a waiver of the lapse of the
10
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original policy and the reinstatement thereof in full
force, including the incontestable clause. The court
held that the reinstatement could be attacked for
fraudulent procurement notwithstanding the expiration of the limitation period of the incontestable
clause in the original contract. The court noted that
no contest could be made as to fraudulent misrepresentations in the original issuance of the policy since
the one-year period of contestability had expired.
It is respectfully submitted that this court did
not intend to overrule the case of Gressler vs. New
York Life Insurance Company, 108 Utah 173, 156
P. 2d 212 (1945), which squarely holds that an insurance company is entitled to make a fair investigation of an insured prior to reinstating the policy. We
submit that this Court's opinion in Burnham vs.
Bankers Life & Casualty Company, supra, cannot be
construed to deprive insurers of their right to investigate the insurability of an applicant upon application
for reinstatement of a policy, a conclusion which the
appellant has attempted to assert in the present appeal. We respect£ully urge this court not to adopt a
rule which would immediately revive an insurance
policy upon the mere submission of a reinstatement
application regardless of whether the application contained misrepresentations of material fact or fraud-

ulent statements.
11
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POINT IL
THE QUESTION OF WHETHER DR. BURNHAM FURNISHED EVIDENCE OF INSURABILITY SATISFACTORY TO THE INSURER
WAS NOT DISPOSED OF IN BURNHAM VS.
BANKERS LIFE & CASUALTY COMPANY, 24
UTAH 2d 277, 470 P. 2d 261 (1970).

We take issue at the outset with appellant's a\.
legation that the "only defense to payment relied upon by defendant" is by way of a provision in the reinstatement applicati on (Brief of Appellant, p. 6).
Defendant's Amended Answer alleges:
1

" ... that at said time and place the de·
ceased made a material misrepresentation of
material facts and that if said facts had been
known to the defendant at said time, said policy would not have been reinstated." (R. 15)
Contrary to appellant's assertions, we rely on the
language of the "reinstatement" clause contained in
the original policy. That clause states:
''This policy may be reinstated (unless
previously surrendered for its cash value) at
any time within 5 years after default in premium payment, upon furnishing evidence o.f
insurability satisfactory to the Company, and
the payment of all past due premiums with interest compounded at 5 % per annum ... " (R.
9) (Emphasis added)
It is our contention that Dr. Burnham's failure tc
disclose the nature and extent of his visits with Dr
Fowler constituted a material misrepresentation oJ
material facts which made it impossible for the in
12
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surance company to determine whether satisfactory
evidence of insurability had in fact been furnished
by Dr. Burnham. As this Court pointed out in Burnham, siipra, and in Gressler vs. New York Life Insnrance Company, 108 Utah 173, 156 P. 2d 212
(1945)

" ... under Utah law a life insurance policy with a clause providing for reinstatement
after lapse for nonpayment of premiums upon
presentation of evidence of insurability satisfactory to the insurer, is not entirely terminated upon def a ult of the premium payment,
for the insured has a contractual right under
the policy to reinstate fully upon compliance
with the conditions for reinstatement contained in the policy." 470 P. 2d at 264. (Emphasis
added)
It was further stated:
" ... By the reinstatement clause, the insured was given an absolute right to reinstate
upon payment of the amount in default and
production of evidence of insurability satisfactory to the company." Id. (Emphasis added)
This Court further emphasized the contingent rather
than absolute right of an insured to reinstate a policy
as follows:
" ... Under the reinstatement clause the
insurer was accorded the right to require whatever evidence of insurability it deemed satisfactory and ~ f ai; oppor_tunity to 1}Wke a complete investigatwn. prior to r~instatement.
When the insurer fmally determmed that the
13
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condition~ ~or rein~tatement had been fulfil].
ed, the origm!ll pohcy was again in full force
and effect as if there had been no prior lapse 11
Id. (Emphasis added)
·

This Court could not have made i't more clear that the
right to reinstate a lapsed insurance policy is contingent upon the insured's furnishing evidence of insur.
ability satisfactory to the company and that the com- '
pany has the right to make a complete investigation
of such evidence prior to reinstatement.
It was further noted in Biirnham, supra, that
the granting of a summary judgment was improper ,
because there remained disputed issues of material
fact:
1

"First, unless the misrepresentations in
the negotiation for an insurance policy are
made with intent to deceive and materially affect either the acceptance of the risk or the
hazard assumed by the insurer, the insurance
contract cannot be avoided by an insurance
company. Mere falsi'ty of answers to questions
propounded are insufficient if not knowingly
made with intent to deceive and defraud. Second, whether or not a misstatement in an ap·
plication is material to the risk, while it is for
the jury to determine, depends n?t upon what
the insurer or the insured may thmk about ~he
materiality or the importance of the.false. m·
formation given or the true informa~10n w1!h·
held but upon what those engaged m them·
sur~nce business, acting reasonably and nat~r
ally in accordance with .the usual pract~c.e
among insur::mce compames under such en·
cumstances, would have done had they known
14
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the truth, that is, whether reasonably careful
and intelligent men would have regarded the
facts stated as substantially increasing the
chai:ices of the happening of the event insured
agamst so as to cause a rejection of the application." 470 P. 2d at 263.
Although it was respondent's belief in the first
Burnham appeal that reasonable minds could not differ on the question of whether Dr. Burnham's failure
to disclose eighty visits with a psychiatrist was intentional and material to the risk, this Court rejected
that argument, pointing out that these were questions "for the jury to determine." Id. Appellant in
her Brief at page 7 recognizes that there are fact
issues remaining for trial, but asserts that respondent is precluded from raising those issues because
it relies solely on the language contained in the reinstatement application. We disagree. We do not believe this Court intended to hold that an insured has
the absolute right to reinstate a lapsed insurance policy notwithstanding misrepresentations of material
facts contained in the reinstatement application. Such
a rule would completely nullify the reinstatement
clause of the policy, which states that reinstatement
is contingent upon the insured's furnishing evidence
of insurability satisfactory to the company. Moreover, it is clear that an insurance company must be
given a fair opportunity to make a complete investigation of an insured prior to reinstatement, and the
company must rely on the accuracy of information
contained in the application, as it did in the case of
15
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?r. Burnham. If such inf0rmation is false or mislead.
Ing and the company relies on the information in reinstati~g a policy, it should certainly be given an opportumty to assert that the insured failed to furnish
satisfactory evidence of insurabiilty as required by '
the original policy. Any other rule would completely
nulli'fy the language in the reinstatement clause.
In Gressler vs. New York Life Insurance Company, supra, the Court specifically held that the mere
filing of an application fer reinstatement did not of
itself revive the policy. The Court stated:
"We cannt)t ai:eept this view that when the
applicant filed' he application to revive together with the necessary papers accompanying it,
and 'there the-;,_, eJ~isted no valid objection to the
form or ::mbst1;,nce of such application, or papers or the pro,;f furnished therewith' the Company could 'dr. but one thing, viz., revive the
policy.' ( Fmp~msis added) The condition for
reviving the policy was not only the presentation at 'the Horne Office of evidence of insurability but such evidence 'satisfactory to the
company.' 'This did not mean that answers. to
questions submitted by the Company which
would show insurability must be accepted by
the Company, nor that the qompany ~?uld
not ask further questions. This phrase satis'f actory to the Company' imp.lies that the
Company must have _opport~mty ~o determine whether the evidence is satisfactory
to it and that means an opportunity to
conduct an investigation to determine whether the answers were correct or wheth~r
the investigation disclosed further matters m
16
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r

1

regard to which the Company may desire to
interrogate the applicant." 163 P. 2d at 329
Thus an insurance policy does not automatically
become reinstated upon the mailing of an application
forrn, nor at any other time before the insurance company has had an opportunity to make an investigation of the insured. The reason for a question in the
reinstatement application form which requires the
insured to list physicians with whom he has consulted
is so that the insurance company may investigate and
determine the nature of the treatment given by the
physicians. An insurance company would have particular interest in visits made by an insured to a psychiatrist, especially where suicidal expressions were
made. It is respectfully submitted, therefore, that
there were a numberof issues which were not resolved
by the Burnham opinion and which were left to the
determination of the trial court. These factual questions include (1) whether Dr. Preston J. Burnham
committed a fraud upon the insurance company when
he failed to disclose eighty prior visits with Dr. Fowler; ( 2) whether the omission by Dr. Burnham was
intentional; ( 3) whether the omission was material
to the risk; and ( 4) whether a reasonably careful and
intelligent insurer would have rejected Dr. Burnham's application on the basis of the omission. In
view of the remaining issues, the trial court did not
err in refusing to grant plaintiff's Motion For Summary Judgment.
17
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CONCLUSION
It is apparent from the Burnham opinion that
this Court did not intend to nullify the incontestability clause or the reinstatement clause of Dr. Burnham's original policy which states that reinstatement
is contingent upon the furnishing of evidence of insurability satisfactory to the company. Language by
this Court in the Bitrnhani opinion makes it absolutely clear 'that the only issues decided in the first appeal
were ( 1) that the trial co:.irt erred in granting defendant's motion for summary judgment because issues of material fact rem2.ined for trial; (2) that
Section 31-22-18 ( 1) which allows an additional contestability period after reinstatement was not appli- ,
cable; and ( 3) that the reinstatement application did
not constitute an offer to make a new contract of insurance but was simply a step toward compliance
with the conditions specified in the reinstatement
clause of the original insurance contract.
It is submitted that this Court did not by its
decision attempt to decide any questions of fact nor
did it attempt to state what law should govern the
case except with respect to Section 31-22-18(1) and
the nullified provision in the reinstatement application. Respondent, therefore, submits that the trial
court properly denied plaintiff's motion for summary
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judgment and that the case should be set down for
trial to determine those questions offact set out in the
Burnham opm10n.
Respectfully submitted,

HANSON & GARRETT

Don J. Hanson
520 Continental Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Respondent
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